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ABSTRACT					We	investigate	the	factors	influencing	an	academic’s	propensity	to	patent	and	the	quality	of	patenting	in	nanotechnology	and	biotechnology.	We	find	that	a	university	researcher	is	more	likely	to	be	listed	as	an	inventor	of	a	patented	innovation,	regardless	of	the	assignee,	if	he	receives	private	funding,	has	a	fairly	high	level	of	cliquishness	in	the	scientific	network	and	has	shown	a	prior	capacity	to	successfully	collaborate	with	industry,	a	concept	that	we	name	innovation	loops.	Furthermore,	citation	rate	and	number	of	claims,	which	are	both	used	to	represent	patent	quality,	are	influenced	by	factors	similar	to	those	explaining	patent	quantity.	
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1. Introduction	
Worldwide,	scientists	have	been	encouraged	to	work	within	increasingly	large	networked	teams,	a	
phenomenon	exemplified	in	Canada	by	the	Networks	of	Centres	of	Excellence	(NCE)	initiative	put	in	
place	more	than	20	years	ago	(in	1989).	Co-publication	and	co-invention	networks	have	been	studied	
extensively	in	the	literature	to	measure	the	social	and	epistemic	proximities	between	scientists	and	
inventors	(Balconi	et	al.,	2004;	Singh,	2005).	While	academic	networks,	or	social	capital,	are	important	to	
science-based	entrepreneurial	firms	(Murray,	2004),	how	these	benefit	individual	scientists	and	their	
scientific	and	technological	production	have	rarely	been	examined.	The	study	of	D’Este	et	al.	(2012)	is	an	
exception	but	unfortunately	they	find	no	evidence	that	the	size	of	the	research	network	influences	the	
propensity	of	an	academic	to	patent.	Generally,	however,	the	productivity	and	performance	points	of	
view	examined	are	that	of	the	firm	(Owen-Smith	and	Powell,	2004;	Graf	and	Krüger,	2011)	or	of	the	
capacity	of	academic	inventors	or	entrepreneurs	to	start	their	own	firms	(see	Rothaermel	et	al.	2007	for	
a	review).	
In	addition	to	encouraging	cross-discipline	collaboration,	some	of	the	main	goals	of	the	NCE	program	
were	to	“increase	industry	investment	in	research	and	development	partnerships”	and	to	“accelerate	
the	commercialization	of	technologies,	products	and	services”.	The	links	between	university	and	
industry	however	continue	to	be	the	object	of	a	heated	debate	between	the	advocates	of	science	as	a	
public	good	and	those	in	favour	of	the	universities’	third	mission	or	of	the	entrepreneurial	university.	In	
support	of	the	latter,	Governments	are	increasingly	looking	for	ever	more	efficient	mechanisms	to	
transfer	knowledge	from	university	to	industry.	This	paper	contributes	to	this	effort	by	aiming	to	
disentangle	the	effect	of	scientific	networks,	public	funding	and	private	contracts	on	the	patenting	
performance	of	academics.	Our	study	hence	stands	out	from	the	literature	because	of	its	triangular	
approach	to	academic	patent	performance.	This	study	benefits	from	having	built	an	extremely	rich	
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database	on	funding,	both	public	and	private,	publications	and	patents	of	Quebec	biotechnology	and	
nanotechnology	academics,	hence	providing	a	complete	portrait	of	research	inputs	and	outputs.	
Our	theoretical	framework	thus	stands	at	the	confluent	of	the	literatures	on	networks	(Breschi	and	
Catalini,	2010;	Cowan	&	Jonard,	2003),	academic	patenting	(Balconi	et	al.,	2004;	Breschi	et	al.,	2005;	
Meyer,	2006)	and	university-industry	linkages	(Etzkowitz,	1998;	D’Este	&	Patel,	2007).	The	involvement	
of	academics	in	patented	innovations	may	be	due	to	a	number	of	factors,	i.e.	technology	push	from	
publicly	funded	research	or	demand	pull	from	industry-contracted	research.	The	underlying	theme	of	
the	article	remains	the	fact	that	academics	do	not	generally	work	alone,	hence	the	importance	of	
networks	throughout	the	innovation	process	and	of	the	position	occupied	by	academic	inventors	within	
these	scientific	networks.	We	also	introduce	a	novel	concept	which	we	call	‘innovation	loops’	that	aims	
to	follow	the	money	from	the	first	investment	of	a	firm	towards	an	academic’s	research	and	back	to	the	
firm	as	the	assignee	of	a	patented	innovation	in	which	the	contracted	academic	is	a	named	inventor.		
This	study	hence	focuses	on	evaluating	the	innovative	performance	of	academics	in	nanotechnology	and	
biotechnology	and	our	goal	is	twofold.	First,	we	wish	to	examine	the	factors	contributing	to	the	
patenting	output	of	a	university	researcher.	Second,	we	aim	to	measure	the	impact	of	these	factors	on	
the	quality	of	patents	as	defined	by	claims	and	citation	rates.	Our	focus	is	therefore	on	academic	
patenting	rather	that	university	patenting	to	ensure	that	all	patents	to	which	academics	contributed	are	
accounted	for	(Czarnitzki	et	al.,	2011;	Geuna	&	Nesta,	2006).	
The	remainder	of	the	article	proceeds	as	follows.	Section	2	examines	the	supporting	literature	and	
proposes	hypotheses	concerning	networking,	industry-university	collaboration	and	funding.	Section	3	
provides	a	concise	data	and	variables	description,	and	explains	the	estimation	methods	used.	Section	4	
analyses	our	regression	results.	Finally,	section	5	discusses	the	validation	of	our	hypotheses	and	
concludes	with	a	brief	synthesis	outlining	our	contributions	and	directions	for	further	research.	
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2. Theoretical	Framework	and	Hypotheses	
In	science-based	high	technology	fields	such	as	nanotechnology	and	biotechnology,	the	distinction	
between	basic	and	applied	research	is	a	very	fine	one	(Robinson	et	al.,	2007).	Moreover,	both	fields	can	
be	considered	Grilichesian	breakthroughs,	i.e.	they	are	both	inventions	of	methods	of	inventing	(Darby	
&	Zucker,	2003).	This	characteristic	makes	them	scientifically	and	economically	invaluable.	Finally,	these	
are	fields	for	which	patents	are	an	important	mechanism	of	intellectual	property	protection,	hence	
facilitating	the	measure	of	innovation.		
Let	us	first	briefly	justify	our	use	of	patents,	claims	and	citations	as	measures	of	innovation	and	quality.	
On	the	one	hand,	Rothaermel	&	Thursby	(2007)	remind	us	that	the	patent	represents	an	instance	in	
which	a	novel,	non-trivial	and	useful	invention	comes	to	fruition,	and	Blackman	(1995)	shows	that	up	to	
80%	of	all	technological	knowledge	is	contained	in	them.	On	the	other	hand,	firms	collaborating	with	
academics	may	however	prefer	secrecy	as	a	means	to	protect	the	intellectual	property	developed	
(Cohen	et	al.,	2000),	while	some	academics	may	prefer	to	put	their	innovation	in	the	public	domain	via	
publication	in	very	applied	journals.	Patents	are	nevertheless	used	by	many	scholars	for	the	study	of	
innovation	in	nanotechnology	(Meyer	&	Persson,	1998;	Meyer,	2006)	and	biotechnology	(Breschi	&	
Catalini,	2010;	Murray	&	Stern,	2007).	
Citations	are	useful	in	determining	the	invention’s	capacity	to	enable	further	innovation	and	are	used	by	
a	number	of	scholars	(Lanjouw	&	Schankerman,	2004;	Bonaccorsi	&	Thoma,	2007)	as	a	reliable	indicator	
of	patent	quality.	Czarnitzki	et	al.	(2011,	pp.	1403)	for	instance	show	that	“academic	involvement	in	
patenting	results	in	a	citation	premium”.	Claims	can	also	be	utilised	as	an	indicator	of	patent	quality	
(Tong	&	Frame,	2004).	The	idea	here	is	that	the	more	claims	associated	to	a	patent	the	broader	the	
scope	of	the	invention.		
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Sociologists	have	a	long	tradition	of	using	social	network	analysis	to	study	the	behaviour	of	individuals	
(see	for	instance	Granovetter,	1973).	More	recently,	Newman	(2001)	has	shown	that	scientific	networks	
form	a	“small	world”,	i.e.	cliquish	with	relatively	short	paths.	The	redundancy	of	the	links	implied	by	
higher	cliquishness	ensures	the	development	of	a	common	language	and	the	establishment	of	trust	
among	the	team,	which	should	enhance	innovation.	Highly	cliquish	networks	generally	enhance	system	
performance	and	knowledge	diffusion	(Uzzi	&	Spiro,	2005;	Schilling	&	Phelps,	2007).	Transposing	their	
argument	to	the	realm	of	scientific	networks	implies	that	being	surrounded	by	a	more	integrated	clique	
should	increase	academic	innovation	performance.	But	only	up	to	a	point	as	Cowan	and	Jonard	(2003)	
highlight	the	negative	effects	of	redundancy	stemming	from	a	high	cliquishness	and	Fleming	et	al.	(2007)	
find	a	negative	impact	of	higher	cliquishness	on	innovation	productivity.		
Breschi	&	Catalini	(2010)	find	that	even	though	they	present	different	objectives	and	reward	structures	
(Dasgupta	&	David,	1994),	university	and	industry	researchers	are	relatively	well	connected.	In	fact,	they	
find	that	academic-inventors	who	link	these	two	communities	present	a	higher	betweenness	centrality	
measure	in	the	scientific	network	and	are	essential	to	reducing	the	gap	separating	science	and	
technology,	i.e.	they	have	a	strong	intermediary	role	in	the	network.	Beaudry	and	Allaoui	(2012)	show	
that	a	more	central	intermediary	position	(higher	betweenness	centrality)	in	the	scientific	network	has	a	
positive	impact	on	the	number	of	articles	published	by	academics.		
When	studying	the	factors	that	contribute	to	a	scientist’s	innovative	output,	accounting	for	the	position	
in	the	co-authorship	network	is	therefore	crucial	if	only	for	the	great	inter-connexion	that	exists	
between	science	and	technology	in	high	tech	industries.	This	evidence	hence	brings	us	to	propose	our	
first	hypothesis:	
H1:	(a)	A	more	central	network	position	and	(b)	being	surrounded	by	a	more	integrated	clique	are	
beneficial	to	both	the	quantity	and	the	quality	of	patents	of	an	academic-inventor.		
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University	scientists	do	not	solely	collaborate	with	other	university	researchers,	an	increasing	number	of	
them	also	have	links	with	industry,	especially	in	high	technology	fields	where	the	connexion	between	
basic	science	and	applied	science	is	greatly	significant,	highlighting	the	importance	of	such	partnerships	
(Meyer	&	Persson,	1998).	Collaboration	between	firms	and	academics	has	been	extensively	studied	
(Brusoni	et	al.,	2001;	Meyer,	2006),	generally	concentrating	on	the	benefits	to	firms	(Bonaccorsi	and	
Piccagula,	1994;	Murray,	2004):	lower	R&D	costs,	building	and	maintaining	a	solid	science	base,	higher	
innovation	production,	etc.	Academics	also	greatly	rely	on	this	type	of	collaboration	as	the	advantages	
are	numerous:	increased	funding,	exploration	of	research	areas	which	were	not	originally	intended,	
exposure	to	state	of	the	art	application	of	their	technology,	the	possibility	to	enhance	their	professional	
network,	exposure	to	new	ideas,	etc.	(Agrawal	&	Henderson,	2002;	Siegel	et	al.,	2003).	Czarnitzki	et	al.	
(2011,	pp.	1429)	further	adds	that	“academic	involvement	in	patenting	results	in	greater	knowledge	
externalities	as	measured	by	forward	citations”.	The	underlying	university-industry	collaboration	clearly	
benefits	both	the	firm	and	the	academics	involved.	
A	number	of	measures	can	be	used	to	assess	the	extent	of	industry-academia	collaboration.	One	such	
measure	of	faculty	consulting	is	firm-assigned	patents	on	which	academics	are	named	inventors	(Jensen	
et	al.,	2010;	Thursby	and	Thursby,	2011).	In	this	article	we	are	interested	in	the	commercially	driven	
academic	consulting	(Perkmann	and	Walsh,	2008),	which	is	more	likely	to	result	in	patenting.	We	
therefore	expect	to	validate	the	following	hypothesis:	
H2:	Academic	scientists	that	contribute	to	patents	of	private	organisations	that	have	funded	their	
research	are	more	likely	to	patent	innovations	of	a	greater	quality.	
University-industry	collaboration	may	not	however	benefit	both	parties	equally;	patenting	may	have	a	
negative	effect	on	publishing.	The	possible	trade-off	(or	substitution)	between	the	production	of	
patentable	technology	and	of	scientific	knowledge	has	been	explained	by	the	anti-commons	hypothesis	
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(Heller	&	Eisenberg,	1998;	Murray	&	Stern,	2007),	the	clear	distinction	between	science	and	technology	
reward	structures	(Dasgupta	and	David,	1994;	Stephan,	1996),	or	the	fact	that	patenting	is	time	
consuming	(Azoulay	et	al.,	2006).	Lower	publication	rates	can	also	be	attributable	to	the	fact	that	some	
academics	are	required	to	hold	on	to	information	relevant	to	a	patent	prior	to	its	application	in	order	to	
maintain	the	novelty	of	the	innovation,	i.e.	the	delay-of-publication	clause	(Breschi	et	al.,	2007;	Thursby	
&	Thursby,	2002).		
Some	degree	of	complementarity	between	patents	and	papers	is	also	conceivable	(Murray,	2002;	Owen-
Smith	&	Powell,	2003)	because	“patents	can	be	a	logical	outcome	of	research	activity”	(Stephan	et	al.,	
2007,	pp.	74)	or	“most	patentable	research	is	also	publishable”	(Agrawal	&	Henderson,	2002,	pp.	58).	
Owen-Smith	and	Powell	(2001)	suggest	that	scientists	patent	because	it	increases	their	visibility	and	that	
of	the	novelty	of	their	research.	Because	research	in	nanotechnology	and	biotechnology	often	overlaps	
both	science	and	technology,	complementarity	could	overcome	the	substitution	effect	between	patent	
and	papers.	We	have	thus	chosen	to	focus	on	inputs,	i.e.	funding,	rather	than	potentially	competing	
outputs,	i.e.	articles3.	
Funding	is	indeed	essential	to	research	in	high	tech	fields,	if	only	for	the	fact	that	infrastructure	and	
equipment	are	expensive	(Robinson	et	al.,	2007).	Two	main	sources	of	funding	can	be	distinguished:	
grants,	mostly	provided	by	various	public	sources,	and	contracts,	often	awarded	by	private	entities	with	
the	intent	of	fulfilling	a	specific	set	of	applied	goals	generally	set	by	the	contractor.	Receiving	grants	
helps	a	scientist	to	concentrate	on	publishing	activities.	Not	only	will	this	increase	the	scientist’s	prestige	
or	reputation	within	the	scientific	community,	it	will	in	turn	incite	the	institution	of	affiliation	to	
																																								 																				
3	In	light	of	the	evidence	presented,	examining	the	possible	reinforcing	effect	of	publishing	on	patenting	could	in	
fact	be	seen	as	reverse	causality.	The	issue	of	endogeneity	between	funding	and	articles	is	addressed	later	in	the	
article.	
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financially	reward	that	scientist	(Stephan	&	Levin,	1992).	Increasingly	however,	researchers	are	
patenting	the	results	of	their	publicly	funded	research.	Contracts	in	contrast	may	also	lead	to	inventions	
that	are	most	often	subsequently	patented.	It	has	recently	been	shown	that	accepting	contracts	not	only	
does	not	hinder	an	academic’s	publishing	performance	(Gulbrandsen	&	Smeby,	2002;	Geuna	&	Nesta,	
2006)	it	also	increases	the	quantity	and	quality	of	publications	which	can	in	turn	be	beneficial	for	
patenting.	Our	third	hypothesis	thus	reads	as	follows:	
H3:	(a)	Grants	and	(b)	contracts	have	a	positive	effect	on	patenting	and	on	the	quality	of	these	patents.	
3. Methodology	
3.1 Data	description	
This	research	is	based	on	the	combination	of	three	sources	of	data	on	patents,	scientific	articles	and	a	
detailed	account	of	university	funding	received	by	academics	in	Quebec,	Canada.	Patent	data	was	
extracted	from	the	United	States	Patent	and	Trademark	Office	(USPTO).	Because	of	the	proximity	to	the	
US	and	the	fact	that	it	is	a	much	larger	market,	most	firms	that	protect	their	intellectual	property	in	
Canada,	also	do	so	in	the	US.	The	Canadian	Intellectual	Property	Office	(CIPO)	does	not	provide	the	
addresses	of	inventors	in	a	consistent	manner,	which	is	essential	for	the	disambiguation	of	the	merged	
data.		
Data	extraction	used	the	OECD’s	(2005)	list	of	biotechnology-related	Industrial	Patent	Classification	(IPC)	
codes	and	a	combination	of	nanotechnology-related	keywords	taken	from	Barirani	et	al.	(forthcoming).	
Although	a	classification	highlighting	nanotechnology	IPC	codes	exists	(Igami	&	Okazaki,	2007)	it	was	not	
used	because	“[t|he	lexical	query	of	Porter	et	al.	(2008)	returns	nearly	50,000	patents	between	1990	
and	2005,	while	the	USPTO	currently	(as	of	June	2012)	classifies	only	4,193	patents	in	class	977	for	the	
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same	period”	(Barirani	et	al.	forthcoming)4.	Selecting	only	the	patents	for	which	at	least	one	inventor	
has	an	address	in	Canada;	we	have	extracted	12	836	biotechnology	patents	and	5	934	nanotechnology	
patents	between	1976	and	2005.	For	these	patents,	we	extracted	all	the	citations	up	to	the	end	of	2009.	
Data	relative	to	publishing	was	extracted	from	Elsevier’s	SCOPUS	which	compiles	all	information	
pertaining	to	scientific	article	abstracts	and	citations.	For	nanotechnology,	we	used	the	same	keywords	
that	were	utilised	for	the	patent	extraction	while	for	biotechnology,	we	used	the	keyword	search	
developed	by	Clerk-Lamalice	(2009).	Once	again	selecting	only	the	scientific	articles	on	which	at	least	
one	author	has	an	affiliation	in	Canada,	we	found	138	136	biotechnology	articles	and	42	543	
nanotechnology	articles	between	1929	and	2009.	
Finally,	the	funding	data	is	provided	by	the	Système	d’Information	de	la	Recherche	Universitaire5	(SIRU),	
a	system	managed	by	the	Quebec	Government	which	accounts	for	all	public	and	private	funding	
received	by	Quebec	academics	on	a	yearly	basis,	specifying	the	source	and	amounts	obtained.	The	SIRU	
database	has	been	‘cleaned’	and	verified	by	the	Observatoire	des	Sciences	et	des	Technologies	and	
hence	provides	an	excellent	base	for	the	merger	of	patent	and	article	data.	We	can	therefore	track	firms	
																																								 																				
4	We	deliberately	cast	a	wider	net	using	keywords	because	we	want	to	ensure	that	we	get	the	complete	set	of	
articles	and	patents	produced	by	Quebec	biotechnology	and	nanotechnology	academics.	The	funding	database	to	
which	we	have	access	only	mentions	the	title	of	the	grant	and	contracts,	it	is	therefore	very	difficult	to	assess	
which	grants	and	contracts	would	be	dedicated	to	purely	biotechnology	or	nanotechnology	research.	For	this	
reason,	we	believe	judicious	to	include	more	articles	and	patents	to	ensure	that	academics	on	the	periphery	of	
biotechnology	and	nanotechnology	do	not	bias	the	results	because,	for	instance,	only	half	of	their	scientific	and	
technological	production	is	accounted	for.	We	have	verified	for	a	small	sample	of	scientists	for	which	we	have	the	
CV	that	this	method	catches	most	of	their	production.	It	yields	better	results	than	say	using	the	977	USPTO	
nanotechnology	classification.		
5	Information	System	on	University	Research.	
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and	other	organisations	that	fund	academics	and	that	are	subsequently	the	assignees	of	patents	on	
which	the	funded	researchers	are	named	inventors.		
Merging	these	three	databases	required	a	considerable	amount	of	work	to	overcome	the	traditional	
disambiguation	of	individuals.	Addresses	of	inventors	and	affiliations	of	scientists	(from	both	SIRU	and	
Scopus)	were	checked	manually	to	clearly	identify	the	academic	inventors,	eliminate	dual	entries	due	to	
misspelling	of	names	(synonymy)	and	add	alter	egos	of	individuals	with	similar	names	but	clearly	
differing	affiliations	and	addresses	through	time	(homonymy).		
Selecting	only	the	scientists	that	have	published	at	least	five	articles	in	the	domains	(biotechnology	or	
nanotechnology)	during	the	course	of	their	career,	our	final	sample	comprises	of	1460	scientists	from	
1996	to	2005,	with	on	average	6	years	of	‘presence’	for	a	sample	of	9068	observations.	The	reason	for	
selecting	only	these	scientists	stems	from	the	fact	that	we	want	to	limit	the	number	of	scientists	that	
sporadically	publish	or	patent	in	these	two	fields	for	which	we	would	not	be	able	to	distinguish	the	
funding	that	relates	to	nanotechnology	or	biotechnology	from	that	of	chemistry,	biology	or	material	
science,	for	instance.	We	are	relatively	confident	that	the	selected	individuals	are	active	nanotechnology	
and	biotechnology	scientists.	
In	addition	to	matching	individuals,	we	also	had	to	correctly	identify	the	assignees	(from	USPTO)	that	
had	contributed	to	research	contracts	(from	SIRU)	of	Quebec	academics.	This	exercise	was	performed	
manually	to	account	for	corporate	restructuring,	name	variations	(including	French	to	English)	and	
known	horizontal	mergers.	Having	identified	the	scientists	that	have	performed	contracted	work	with	an	
organisation	prior	to	being	a	named	inventors	on	a	patent	assigned	to	that	particular	organisation,	we	
constructed	what	we	referred	to	earlier	as	‘innovation	loops’.	The	identification	of	these	loop	is	an	
extensive	process	that	also	takes	into	account	previous	work	by	Calero	et	al.	(2006)	to	reduce	
homonymy	and	synonymy	of	actors’	names	and	Daim	et	al.	(2007)	for	time-framing.	
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3.2 Variables	
From	the	patents,	three	dependant	variables	are	constructed	for	each	inventor	for	any	given	year:	the	
number	of	patents	on	which	a	university	researcher	is	listed	as	an	inventor	[nbPatents],	the	number	of	
claims	contained	in	this	patent	[nbClaims]	and	the	number	of	citations	received	after	5	years	
[nbCitations].	The	citations	are	compiled	over	a	fixed	interval	of	5	years6	in	order	to	eliminate	the	bias	
that	would	occur	with	older	patents	receiving	a	disproportionate	amount	of	citations	compared	to	more	
recent	ones.	These	are	the	three	dependent	variables	of	the	models	described	below.	The	basic	
statistics	of	the	variables	along	with	the	correlation	table	are	presented	in	Table	2	in	Appendix	A.	
Using	co-publication	data,	we	characterise	the	co-publishing	network	to	calculate	various	network	
indicators	of	a	researcher’s	position	within	the	scientific	community.	In	this	paper	we	focus	on	two	of	
these	measures	to	determine	the	network	position:	individual	cliquishness	[Cliquishness]	and	
betweenness	centrality	[Betweenness],	which	are	calculated	over	a	3-year7	period	to	account	for	
extended	collaboration8.		
Turning	now	to	our	measure	of	university-industry	collaboration,	[nbLoops]	essentially	represents	the	
number	of	instances	in	which	an	academic	is	listed	as	an	inventor	on	a	patent	owned	by	the	firm	
(assignee)	that	originally	funded	the	academic’s	research	up	to	year	t.	We	believe	this	variable	to	be	a	
good	indicator	of	successful	collaboration	between	industry	and	university.		
																																								 																				
6	Citations	were	also	compiled	over	periods	of	3	and	7	years	but	regressions	using	5-year	citation	intervals	yielded	
the	best	results.	
7	5-year	networks	were	also	investigated	but	the	results	were	better	for	3-year	networks.	
8	We	have	investigated	other	network	indicators,	such	as	degree	centrality	and	closeness	centrality.	They	did	not	
consistently	yield	statistically	significant	results	and	they	present	too	strong	a	correlation	with	betweenness	
centrality	to	be	included	in	the	regressions	as	well.		
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Funding	data	takes	into	account	both	grants	and	contracts.	Because	the	amounts	received	may	not	
reflect	the	annual	spending,	we	calculate	the	average	total	funding	over	a	3-year	period	for	contracts	
[Contracts]	and	for	grants	[Grants].	
In	addition,	we	add	a	number	of	control	variables	to	the	models	presented	below.	To	account	for	the	
fact	that	scientists	might	be	surrounded	by	a	large	critical	mass	of	researchers	compared	to	relatively	
isolated	groups,	we	add	the	proportion	of	individuals	that	the	component	to	which	they	belong	
represents	[propComponent].	We	also	control	for	the	fragmentation	of	the	network	in	the	measure	of	
the	number	of	components	necessary	to	account	for	80%	of	the	scientists	[nbComponent].	To	control	for	
the	cumulative	nature	of	applied	science,	we	build	an	ordinal	variable	that	takes	the	value	0	if	a	
researcher	has	never	patented	in	the	past,	1	if	he	has	patented	once,	and	2	if	he	patented	more	than	
two	patents	in	the	past	[PastPatenting]	relative	to	the	application	year.	In	examining	the	effects	of	
publishing	on	patenting	we	calculate	the	mean9	degree	of	application	[BasicResearch]	of	the	knowledge	
associated	with	the	articles	published	by	a	researcher	over	the	3-year	period	leading	to	patent	
application.	This	degree	of	application	is	a	concept	we	borrow	from	Hamilton	(2003)	and	is	based	upon	
an	ordinal	classification	of	the	journals,	in	which	articles	are	published,	from	applied	to	basic	research	on	
a	scale	ranging	from	1	to	4.	We	postulate	that	academics	that	patent	in	more	basic	journals	are	less	
likely	to	patent.	
Finally,	the	years	[d1996-d2005]	and	institutional	affiliations	(university	dummy	variables)	are	also	
compiled	as	they	may	help	explain	why	certain	researchers	are	more	prolific	inventors	than	others	and	
why	their	patents	are	of	better	quality	than	others.		
																																								 																				
9	We	have	explored	using	the	median,	minimum	and	maximum	value	of	the	degree	of	application.	Only	the	mean	
value	however	yielded	significant	results.	
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3.3 Estimation	methods	
The	data	are	set	up	longitudinally	in	a	panel,	taking	into	account	each	researcher’s	yearly	performance	
from	199610	to	2005.	All	three	dependent	variables	are	non-negative	discrete	variables,	i.e.	count	data.	
The	preferred	method	in	this	case	is	generally	the	Poisson	regression,	however	its	main	structural	
requirement,	i.e.	having	equidispersion,	is	not	satisfied	in	any	of	our	cases,	we	therefore	use	the	
negative	binomial	regression	and	its	variants.	Three	alternative	methods	are	used:	(1)	negative	binomial	
regression	with	the	panel	option	(xtnbreg),	(2)	negative	binomial	regression	(nbreg)	and	(3)	zero-inflated	
negative	binomial	regression	(zinb)	taking	into	consideration	repeated	observations	for	individuals.	
It	is	preferable	to	estimate	the	regressions	in	a	panel	format	(xtnbreg)	since	our	database	is	constructed	
longitudinally,	i.e.	modelling	both	identity	and	time	dimensions.	The	zero-inflated	model	proves	useful	
when	there	are	an	excess	of	zeros	in	the	dependent	variable.	In	our	case,	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	
there	are	several	years	in	which	academics	do	not	patent.	For	instance	a	researcher	may	have	had	the	
opportunity	to	patent	an	invention	but	opted	not	to	do	so	or	he	may	not	have	had	the	opportunity	to	
patent	due	to	the	lack	of	an	invention,	resources,	funding,	and	so	on.	The	negative	binomial	regression	
model	to	be	estimated	is	therefore	the	following	for	the	three	dependent	variables:	
!"#$%&!%'(!")*$+,'(!")+%$%+-!'( = /
ln 23$!%(45 , ln 23$!%'(45 7 , ln )-!%3$8%'(45 ,93-9)-,9-!&!%(, !")-,9-!&!%80(, <&%=&&!!&''(47,)*+>?+'ℎ!&''(47, )*+>?+'ℎ!&''(47 7, !"A--9(45, <$'+8(45,#$'%#$%&!%+!B(45, CD$!-, C<+-, CE!+F, CG&$3 	
The	first	part	of	the	zero-inflated	regression	model	estimates	the	propensity	of	a	researcher	‘not’	to	
patent	using	a	logit	or	a	probit	regression.	This	propensity	is	modelled	as:	
																																								 																				
10	The	year	1996	is	chosen	as	a	start	date	as	prior	to	1996,	Scopus	and	SIRU	are	less	reliable.	
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C#$%&!%'( = / ln 23$!%'(45 , ln 23$!%'(45 7 ,)*+>?+'ℎ!&''(47, )*+>?+'ℎ!&''(47 7,!"A--9(45, <$'+8(45, #$'%#$%&!%+!B(45,CD$!-, C<+- 	
One	element	of	paramount	importance	that	we	have	not	yet	discussed	is	the	inherent	problem	of	
endogeneity	when	dealing	with	such	types	of	data.	Contracts	may	be	easier	to	obtain	when	a	researcher	
leads	a	well	(publicly)	funded	lab.	The	amount	of	funds	necessary	to	finance	this	research	is	influenced	
by	the	publication	record	of	the	individual	scientist	and	of	his	team	and	vice	versa	(Beaudry	and	Allaoui,	
2012).	These	publications	may	however	be	delayed	because	of	patenting	activities,	and	so	on	and	so	
forth.	Accounting	for	potential	endogeneity	is	therefore	key	to	mitigating	potential	bias	in	our	
regressions.	As	described	here,	this	endogeneity	is	mostly	due	to	the	simultaneity	of	one	or	more	
dependant	variables.	Hence	this	situation	is	dealt	with	by	performing	two-stage	residual	inclusion	(2SRI)	
on	the	negative	binomial	regressions11	(Terza	et	al.,	2008)	and	two-stage	least	squares	(2SLS)	on	the	
zero-inflated	negative	binomial	regressions	(Stephan	et	al.,	2007).	During	the	course	of	our	research,	we	
have	examined	three	potentially	endogenous	variables,	the	number	of	articles,	the	amount	of	grants	
and	the	amount	of	contracts.	Only	one,	the	latter,	proved	to	be	endogenous	and	will	be	presented	in	
this	article.	The	first-stage	regression	to	be	estimated	using	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	is	therefore	the	
following,	taking	into	account	the	endogenous	variable	relative	to	the	contracts.	
ln )-!%3$8%'(45 = B	 #$'%A--9(47, ln #$'%)-!%3$8%'(47 , )-C&)ℎ$+3,IB&(, IB&( 7, ln )-!%3$8%'E(45 	
When	instrumenting	for	contracts,	we	use	other	variables	pertaining	to	funding	such	as	the	cumulative	
amount	of	contracts	received	in	the	past	ten	years	[PastContracts]	and	the	average	amount	of	contracts	
																																								 																				
11	Terza	et	al.	(2008)	did	not	use	their	2SRI	method	on	panel	data.	As	a	robustness	check	of	the	use	of	this	method	
in	a	panel	data	format,	we	therefore	include	both	the	non-panel	(nbreg),	accounting	for	the	clustering	of	
individuals,	and	panel	(xtnbreg)	regressions	using	this	method	to	account	for	potential	endogeneity.	
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awarded	to	colleagues	in	the	same	field	at	the	researcher’s	institution	of	affiliation	with	[ContractsU]	to	
consider	the	importance	of	funding	at	the	university	level.	To	account	for	personal	characteristics	we	
add	a	proxy	for	the	age	of	a	scientist	[Age]	(Stephan	et	al.,	2007)	measured	by	the	number	of	years	since	
the	publication	of	the	academic’s	first	article,	which	we	assume	to	correspond	to	the	start	of	an	
academic	career,	from	1985	onwards.	This	attribute	may	play	a	role	in	the	sense	that	older	academics,	
being	less	worried	about	‘perishing’	if	they	don’t	publish,	are	better	positioned	to	allocate	resources	to	
more	financially	rewarding	tasks	(Dasgupta	&	David,	1994;	Thursby	&	Thursby,	2005).	Finally,	we	add	a	
measure	of	intrinsic	quality	of	a	researcher	in	the	type	of	chair	that	she	occupies.	The	variable	
[CodeChair]	is	an	ordinal	indicator	of	the	type	of	chair	that	the	scientist	holds,	with	0	representing	no	
chair,	1	being	an	industrial	chair,	2	being	a	chair	from	two	of	the	Canadian	federal	granting	councils	and	
3	being	a	Canada	research	chair.	For	each	individual,	the	highest	rank	achieved	over	a	career	is	given	to	
an	academic,	regardless	of	the	year	at	which	she	achieved	this	status12.	Finally,	we	also	calculate	the	
cumulative	number	of	loops	to	which	a	researcher	has	contributed	in	his	career	[PastLoop].	
4. Regression	results	
The	results	of	the	regressions	(second	stage	when	relevant)	are	presented	in	Table	1.	We	could	find	no	
endogeneity	in	the	[nbPatents]	regressions	from	either	three	potentially	endogenous	variables,	thus	
regressions	1	to	3	present	the	results	for	the	number	of	patents	without	accounting	for	potential	
endogeneity.	Regressions	4	to	7	show	the	results	for	the	number	of	claims	[nbClaims];	as	there	is	no	
ambiguity	about	the	type	of	zeros,	there	are	no	patents	with	0	claims,	the	zero-inflated	negative	
binomial	regression	model	is	not	appropriate	here.	Finally,	regressions	8	to	13	present	the	results	for	the	
number	of	citations	5	years	after	the	patent	is	granted	[nbCitations].	Table	3	in	appendix	B	presents	the	
first	stage	of	the	negative	binomial	regressions	with	2SRI	as	well	as	the	logit	and	probit	regression	parts	
																																								 																				
12	We	have	tested	an	evolving	version	of	this	chair	variable	in	the	regressions,	but	the	results	were	not	significant.		
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of	the	zero-inflated	negative	binomial	regression	using	OLS	regressions.	The	results	of	the	first	stage	
regressions	show	that	[Contracts]	are	properly	instrumented.		
[Insert	Table	1	about	here]	
Let	us	now	go	through	the	regression	results	starting	with	the	factors	influencing	the	propensity	to	
patent	a	number	of	inventions	for	any	given	year.	We	find	that	there	is	a	positive	effect	of	contracts	on	
patenting13.	The	same	can	be	said	for	an	academic’s	cliquishness,	however	it	presents	a	non-linear	effect	
that	indicates	that	having	too	much	of	an	integrated	network	can	be	unfavourable	for	patenting.	As	far	
as	industry-university	collaboration	is	concerned,	having	participated	in	a	larger	number	of	‘fruitful’	
collaborations	(nbLoops)	in	the	past,	i.e.	one	that	has	led	to	an	industrial	patent,	is	found	to	be	very	
beneficial.	A	history	of	patenting	(PastPatenting)	also	has	a	positive	effect	on	future	patent	output.	
These	two	variables	are	neither	correlated	nor	do	they	have	a	moderating	effect	on	one	another	when	
we	interact	them	in	the	model	(by	adding	an	interactive	term).		
Turning	now	to	the	quality	of	these	patents,	we	find	very	similar	results	for	the	impact	of	past	patenting	
activities	within	innovation	loops	or	not	(nbLoops	and	PastPatenting),	for	both	the	number	of	claims	and	
the	number	of	citations.	Hence	a	both	a	history	of	patenting	and	patenting	collaboratively	lead	to	
inventions	that	are	not	only	of	greater	scope	but	that	also	enable	future	inventions.	As	far	as	network	
effects	are	concerned,	cliquishness,	which	was	important	for	the	number	of	patents,	has	a	slightly	less	
robust	impact	on	the	number	of	claims	and	citations.	In	general,	the	inverted-U	relationship	is	
maintained.	Betweenness	has	however	become	of	interest;	it	seems	that	having	a	more	central	position	
in	the	scientific	community	is	beneficial	for	both	quality	indicators,	the	effect	is	however	not	
consistently	significant.	
																																								 																				
13	Non-linear	effects	were	examined,	but	never	significant.	
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When	accounting	for	funding,	we	notice	that	contracts	generally	contribute	to	better	quality	patents	but	
that	results	on	grants	are	mixed.	When	controlling	for	possible	endogeneity	of	the	contract	variable,	we	
find	endogeneity	only	in	two	of	the	models	examined	(regressions	7	and	9).	While	we	find	that	a	greater	
amount	of	grants	has	some	effect	on	the	number	of	claims,	there	is	no	observable	effect	on	the	number	
of	citations.	The	inverted-U	relationship	between	grants	and	claims	implies	that	the	most	funded	
scientists	produce	patents	of	lesser	‘quality’,	i.e.	too	much	funding	hence	eventually	becomes	
detrimental	to	a	greater	patent	scope.		
5. Discussion	and	conclusion	
At	the	start	of	this	article,	we	set	to	investigate	three	hypotheses	regarding	the	impact	of	various	factors	
on	the	patenting	output	of	academic	scientists.	While	we	are	conscious	of	the	limitations	of	our	study	–	
data	on	small	science-based	domains,	biotechnology	and	nanotechnology,	specific	Canadian	context,	
Canadian	networks	as	opposed	to	world	network	–	we	are	nevertheless	confident	to	our	approach	
following	the	money	through	innovation	loops	while	accounting	for	network	positions	and	funding	
availability	brings	novelty	to	the	literature.	Let	us	address	each	of	these	hypotheses	in	turn.	
The	first	hypothesis	(H1)	postulated	that	a	better	network	position	in	the	co-publication	network	would	
have	a	positive	influence	on	both	the	quantity	and	the	quality	of	the	patents	generated.	While	we	found	
no	evidence	that	a	better	intermediary	position	is	valuable	to	patenting	taken	alone,	it	is	important	for	
the	quality	of	patenting	(consistently	for	claims	and	partly	for	citations),	hence	supporting	the	findings	
of	Owen-Smith	and	Powell	(2004)	for	firms,	and	of	Beaudry	and	Allaoui	(2012)	for	scientists.	More	
centrally	located	individuals	in	the	scientific	network	contribute	to	patents	of	wider	scope	(more	claims)	
in	terms	of	potential	uses,	and	which	are	potentially	more	highly	cited.	
The	most	interesting	finding	of	this	research	is	probably	the	non-linear	effect	of	the	cliquishness	(similar	
to	the	left-hand	leg	of	an	inverted-U	relationship)	for	both	quantity	and	quality	of	patenting,	which	we	
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interpret	as	the	importance,	for	researchers,	of	belonging	to	a	fairly	integrated	community	of	
collaborators.	Too	little	cliquishness	is	not	beneficial	but	too	much	cliquishness	eventually	has	a	
decreasing	returns	effect.	In	other	words,	academic	inventors	increase	the	likelihood	of	patenting	
innovations	of	greater	quality	by	being	surrounded	by	a	more	integrated	clique	(supporting	the	findings	
of	Uzzi	&	Spiro,	2005	as	well	as	that	of	Schilling	&	Phelps,	2007),	but	eventually	the	increased	benefits	of	
integration	start	to	diminish,	hence	suggesting	a	negative	effect	associated	with	too	much	redundancy	
as	highlighted	by	Cowan	and	Jonard	(2003).	We	do	not	observe	a	truly	negative	effect	of	higher	
cliquishness,	as	do	Fleming	et	al.	(2007)14.	This	highlights	the	importance	of	the	diversity	of	links	with	
distinct	epistemic	communities.	Academic	inventors	would	therefore	be	better	off	investing	their	efforts	
in	a	slightly	less	integrated,	or	more	diversified,	scientific	clique,	if	a	great	deal	of	effort	is	required	to	do	
so.	For	instance,	the	type	of	efforts	required	could	be	related	to	setting	up	a	very	large	research	
network,	or	investing	a	great	deal	of	time	in	building	an	international	network.	H1	is	therefore	only	
partially	supported.	
Somewhat	related,	the	second	hypothesis	(H2)	aimed	at	identifying	the	influence	of	university-industry	
collaboration,	which	we	modelled	as	being	part	of	an	innovation	loop,	on	patenting	productivity	and	
quality.	We	found	that	participation	to	innovation	loops	currently	and	in	the	past,	i.e.	the	number	of	
instances	for	which	a	researcher	contracted	by	a	particular	firm	is	a	named	inventor	on	a	patent	of	this	
particular	firm,	has	a	strong	positive	influence	on	the	propensity	to	patent	more	and	to	generate	patents	
of	higher	quality,	in	terms	of	claims	and	of	citations,	hence	validating	H2.	A	closer	implication	of	
academics	into	private	innovation	does	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	propensity	to	patent	of	academics,	
but	also	on	the	quality	of	these	innovations,	a	result	somewhat	akin	with	Czarnitzki	et	al.’s	(2011)	
findings	that	patents	involving	academics	are	more	cited.		
																																								 																				
14	When	we	omit	the	square	term	of	Cliquishness,	we	do	however	obtain	a	negative	coefficient.	We	nevertheless	
believe	that	non-linear	effects	are	important	here.	
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The	third	hypothesis	(H3)	proposed	that	both	grants	and	contracts	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	
propensity	to	patent	and	on	the	quality	of	these	patents.	Not	surprisingly,	we	find	a	positive	and	
significant	relationship	between	contracts	and	patents.	Grants	have	been	shown	to	have	little	to	no	
effect	on	patenting	and	citations.	Contracts	do	however	have	an	impact	on	the	number	of	claims.	The	
relationship	between	public	funding	and	the	number	of	claims	follows	an	inverted-U	relationship,	in	
other	words,	the	relationship	is	positive	up	to	a	certain	threshold	beyond	which	a	larger	amount	of	
funding	becomes	detrimental	to	more	numerous	claims,	hence	suggesting	a	substitution	effect	between	
grants	and	contracts.	Academics	less	successful	at	obtaining	public	funds	may	compensate	this	lack	of	
funding	by	raising	funds	from	private	contracts.	It	is	also	possible	that	researchers	well	provided	in	
contracts	feel	a	lesser	need	to	compete	for	public	funds.	While	our	research	cannot	disentangle	these	
two	effects15	for	the	left-hand	leg	of	the	inverted-U	shaped	curve,	the	negative	effect	(although	not	
always	significant)	of	grants	on	the	number	of	claims	associated	with	greater	amounts	of	public	funds	
suggests	a	more	important	focus	on	basic	research.		
Consequently,	hypothesis	H3a	is	refuted	but	H3b	is	generally	validated.	Canada	has	no	Bayh-Dole	Act	
equivalent	and	all	universities	have	different	intellectual	property	(IP)	protection	policies,	which	could	
explain	why	public	funding	has	no	consistent	effect	on	patents	and	their	quality	and	contracts	dominate	
the	patenting	scene.	Because	Canadian	granting	councils	strongly	encourage	university-industry	
partnerships	in	a	number	of	funding	programs,	an	important	mechanism	to	ensure	that	university	
generated	innovations	end	up	in	industry,	their	effect	on	innovation	may	therefore	be	indirect,	and	
hence	not	picked	up	by	our	analysis.	
																																								 																				
15	We	have	examined	various	models	to	try	to	account	for	these	two	effects,	including	interactive	variables	
between	grants	and	contracts,	but	none	yielded	significant	results.	
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To	sum	up,	what	does	our	research	tell	us	about	the	collaborative	communities	of	academic-inventors?	
First,	researchers	should	collaborate	with	a	number	of	research	communities	that	are	not	perfectly	
interrelated,	hence	maintaining	some	level	of	diversity,	as	it	may	eventually	lead	to	decreasing	returns	in	
terms	of	quantity	and	quality	of	patents.	Second,	our	results	thus	support	the	commercially	driven	
academic	consulting	argument	of	Perkmann	and	Walsh	(2008),	exemplified	by	private	contracts	and	by	
what	we	have	coined	‘innovation	loops’.	In	other	words,	scientists	closely	involved	in	research	that	lead	
to	patents	owned,	and	possibly	instigated,	by	their	private	partners	produce	more	and	better	patents	
than	other	academic-inventors.		
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Table	1:	Second	stage	negative	binomial	regressions	and	zero-inflated	negative	binomial	regressions	on	the	number	of	patents,	claims	and	citations	
		 nbPatents	 		 nbClaims	 		 nbCitations	
	
nbreg	
	
xtnbreg	
	
zinb	
	 	
nbreg	
	
xtnbreg	
	
nbreg	
	
xtnbreg	
	
zinb	
Variable	 (1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	 	
	
(4)	 		 (5)	 		 	 (6)	 		 (7)	 		
	
(8)	 		 (9)	 		 	 (10)	 		 (11)	 		 	 (12)	 		 (13)	 		
	
		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 endo	 		 		 		 		 endo	 		
	
		 		 endo	 		 		 		 		 endo	 		 		 		 		 endo	 		
ln(Grantst-1)	 -0.0061	 		 -0.0167	 		 -0.0308	 		
	
0.2364	 b	 0.2065	 c	
	
0.0169	 		 0.0520	 		
	
0.0467	 		 -0.0577	 		
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(0.0172)	 		 (0.0166)	 		 (0.0238)	 		
	
(0.1096)	 		 (0.1157)	 		
	
(0.0506)	 		 (0.0547)	 		
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propComponent	 0.0092	 c	 0.0066	 		 0.0094	 c	 0.0028	 		 0.0030	 		 0.0055	 		 0.0054	 		 0.0065	 		 0.0067	 		 0.0042	 		 0.0045	 		 0.0034	 		 0.0020	 		
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(0.0849)	 		 (0.0916)	 		
	
(0.1554)	 		 (0.1609)	 		
dNano	 -0.5255	 		 -0.3027	 		 -0.5549	 		
	
-1.9439	 a	 -1.9667	 a	
	
-0.3079	 		 -0.2944	 		
	
-2.0197	 a	 -2.1411	 a	
	
-0.0058	 		 -0.0308	 		
	
-2.2236	 a	 -2.1787	 a	
	
(0.4256)	 		 (0.4241)	 		 (0.4531)	 		
	
(0.6305)	 		 (0.6284)	 		
	
(0.3871)	 		 (0.3870)	 		
	
(0.5778)	 		 (0.5527)			
	
(0.4734)	 		 (0.4739)	 		
	
(0.5330)	 		 (0.5415)	 		
dBio	 -0.3543	 b	 -0.3716	 a	 -0.3509	 b	
	
-0.5001	 b	 -0.4861	 b	
	
-0.2021	 c	 -0.2137	 c	
	
-1.4029	 a	 -1.3504	 a	
	
-0.5075	 a	 -0.4963	 a	
	
-1.0040	 a	 -0.9720	 a	
	
(0.1647)	 		 (0.1356)	 		 (0.1620)	 		
	
(0.2302)	 		 (0.2314)	 		
	
(0.1138)	 		 (0.1140)	 		
	
(0.2761)	 		 (0.2786)			
	
(0.1856)	 		 (0.1858)	 		
	
(0.3600)	 		 (0.3531)	 		
ln(Contractst-1)Res	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 0.0360	 		
	
		 		 -0.0899	 b	
	
		 		 0.1648	 c	
	
		 		 0.1373	 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 (0.0350)	 		
	
		 		 (0.0425)	 		
	
		 		 (0.0997)			
	
		 		 (0.1065)	 		
	
		 		 		 		
ln(Contractt-1)Pred	 		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 -0.0559	 		
	
		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 		 		
	
		 		 (0.0550)	 		
Univ	dummies	 yes	
	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	Year	dummies	 yes	
	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	 	
yes	
	
yes	
	Constant	 -6.0681	 a	 -4.1363	 a	 -5.7661	 a	
	
-3.5668	 a	 -3.6130	 a	
	
-7.3309	 a	 -7.2433	 a	
	
-5.4273	 a	 -5.5903	 a	
	
-5.2251	 a -5.3479	 a
	
0.6604	 		 0.7670	 		
	
(0.6429)	 		 (0.5697)	 		 (1.3011)	 		
	
(0.8637)	 		 (0.8601)	 		
	
(0.5228)	 		 (0.5244)	 		
	
(1.0488)	 		 (1.0343)			
	
(0.7252)	 		 (0.7344)	 		
	
(1.4147)	 		 (1.4104)	 		
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		 nbPatents	 		 nbClaims	 		 nbCitations	
	
nbreg	
	
xtnbreg	
	
zinb	
	 	
nbreg	
	
xtnbreg	
	
nbreg	
	
xtnbreg	
	
zinb	
Variable	 (1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	 	
	
(4)	 		 (5)	 		 	 (6)	 		 (7)	 		
	
(8)	 		 (9)	 		 	 (10)	 		 (11)	 		 	 (12)	 		 (13)	 		
	
		 		 		 		 		 		
	
		 		 endo	 		 		 		 		 endo	 		
	
		 		 endo	 		 		 		 		 endo	 		 		 		 		 endo	 		
ln(α)	 1.4167	 a	
	 	
1.2542	 a	
	
4.0003	 a	 3.9980	 a	
	 	 	 	 	 	
3.4262	 a	 3.4201	 a	
	 	 	 	 	 	
2.1135	a	 2.1024	a	
	
(0.1818)	 		
	 	
(0.1986)	 		
	
(0.0767)	 		 (0.0767)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.1519)	 		 (0.1539)			
	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.1879)	 		 (0.1882)	 		
ln(r)	
	 	
1.6178	 a	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2.0179	 a	 2.0190	 a	
	 	 	 	 	 	
0.5877	 c	 0.5889	c	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
(0.1411)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.6072)	 		 (0.6062)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.3090)	 		 (0.3086)	 		
	 	 	 	 	ln(s)	
	 	
-0.0589	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
6.5817	 a	 6.5803	 a	
	 	 	 	 	 	
1.6016	 b	 1.5986	b	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
(0.1975)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.6955)	 		 (0.6936)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	
(0.6645)	 		 (0.6648)	 		
	 	 	 	 		 		 	 		 		 		 	
	
		 	 		 	 	 		 		 		 		
	
		 	 		 	 	 		 		 		 		 	 	 	 	 	
N	 8786	
	
8786	
	
8786	
	 	
8786	 		 8769	 		
	
8786	 		 8769	 		
	
8786	 		 8769			
	
8786	 		 8769	 		
	
8786	 		 8772	 		
N	groups	 1460	
	
1460	
	
1460	
	 	
1460	 		 1460	 		
	
1460	 		 1460	 		
	
1460	 		 1460			
	
1460	 		 1460	 		
	
1460	 		 1460	 		
Avg	years	 6	
	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	Log	Likelihood	 -2197.9	
	
-2119.9	
	
-2188.4	
	 	
-4274.1	 	 -4273.0	 	
	
-4053.6	 	 -4051.0	 	
	
-1542.2	 	 -1541.0	 	
	
-1459.5	 	 -1458.1	 	
	
-1457.1	 	 -1456.9	 	
χ2	 458.6	a	 300.7	a	 404.8	a	 	 292.3	a	 294.3	a	 	 1194.4	a	 1200.1	a	 	 435.0	a	 460.5	a	 	 483.1	a	 481.1	a	 	 221.2	a	 228.2	a	
Notes:	 a,	b,	and	c	represent	a	degree	of	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	endo	implies	that	the	model	tested	includes	the	estimation	of	an	endogenous	
variable	(Contracts)	in	a	first	stage	regression	presented	in	appendix	B,	in	bold	are	identified	the	regressions	for	which	there	is	endogeneity.	Betweenness	and	
Cliquishness	are	both	multiplied	by	104	to	improve	the	uniformity	of	the	order	of	the	variables.	dNano	and	dBio	exclude	nanobiotechnology,	which	is	the	omitted	
dummy	variable.		
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6. Appendix	A	
Table	2:	Elementary	statistics	and	correlation	table	
Variable	 N	 Mean	 S.D.	 nb
Pa
te
nt
s t	
nb
Cl
ai
m
s t	
nb
Ci
ta
tio
ns
t	
ln
(G
ra
nt
s t-
1)	
([l
n(
Gr
an
ts
t-1
)]²
	
ln
(C
on
tr
ac
ts
t-1
)	
([l
n(
Co
nt
ra
ct
ts
-1
)]²
	
pr
op
Co
m
po
ne
nt
	
nb
Co
m
po
ne
nt
80
	
Be
tw
ee
nn
es
s t-
2	
ln
(C
liq
ui
sh
ne
ss
t-2
)	
[ln
(C
liq
ui
sh
ne
ss
t-2
)]²
	
Ba
sic
Re
se
ar
ch
t	
Nb
Lo
op
s t-
1	
Pa
st
Pa
te
nt
in
g t
-1
	
Cu
m
Lo
op
t-2
	
Cu
m
Co
nt
10
t-2
	
dN
an
o	
dB
io
	
Ag
e t
	
(A
ge
t)2
	
Co
de
Ch
ai
r	
ln
(C
on
tr
ac
ts
U t
-1
)	
nbPatentst	 9068	 0.096	 (0.608)	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	nbClaimst	 9068	 1.743	 (12.028)	 0.82	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	nbCitationst	 9068	 0.127	 (1.212)	 0.62	 0.60	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	ln(Grantst-1)	 9062	 10.375	 (3.269)	 0.01	 0.01	 0.00	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	[ln(Grantst-1)]²	 9062	118.321	 (44.668)	 0.02	 0.01	 0.00	 0.96	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	ln(Contractst-1)	 9065	 3.680	 (4.959)	 0.04	 0.06	 0.03	 0.28	 0.32	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	[ln(Contractst-1)]²	 9065	 38.131	 (54.312)	 0.05	 0.07	 0.03	 0.27	 0.33	 0.98	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	propComponent	 9068	 73.690	 (15.726)	 0.02	 0.01	 0.01	 0.03	 0.04	 0.03	 0.03	 1.00	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
nbComponent80	 9068	 55.866	 (28.195)	 0.06	 0.05	 0.06	-0.09	-0.12	 0.01	 0.01	-0.17	 1.00	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Betweennesst-2	 8795	 0.828	 (0.907)	 0.10	 0.09	 0.05	 0.10	 0.15	 0.08	 0.10	 0.13	 0.06	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	ln(Cliquishnesst-2)	 8795	 4.456	 (6.057)	-0.01	-0.01	 0.00	-0.06	-0.08	-0.03	-0.03	-0.13	 0.04	-0.25	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	[ln(Cliquishnesst-2)]²	 8795	 56.533	 (153.377)	-0.02	-0.02	 0.00	-0.05	-0.07	-0.03	-0.03	-0.13	 0.01	-0.29	 1.00	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	BasicResearcht	 9068	 2.202	 (1.643)	 0.04	 0.03	 0.02	 0.07	 0.10	 0.00	 0.01	 0.14	 0.01	 0.29	-0.09	-0.10	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	NbLoopst-1	 9068	 0.030	 (0.306)	 0.62	 0.52	 0.46	 0.02	 0.02	 0.04	 0.05	 0.01	 0.04	 0.02	-0.02	-0.02	 0.03	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	PastPatentingt-1	 9068	 0.326	 (0.659)	 0.21	 0.20	 0.13	 0.11	 0.15	 0.12	 0.13	 0.08	-0.08	 0.24	-0.10	-0.10	 0.11	 0.13	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	PastLoopt-2	 9068	 0.132	 (0.648)	 0.12	 0.12	 0.06	 0.08	 0.10	 0.11	 0.12	 0.03	-0.06	 0.09	-0.06	-0.05	 0.06	 0.18	 0.45	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	 	PastContractst-2	 9068	 2.0E05	 (1.6E06)	 0.06	 0.05	 0.01	 0.08	 0.13	 0.21	 0.28	 0.02	-0.05	 0.09	-0.02	-0.02	 0.02	 0.01	 0.12	 0.05	 1.00		 	 	 	 	 	dNano	 9068	 0.034	 (0.182)	-0.01	 0.01	 0.00	 0.00	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.11	-0.01	-0.10	 0.03	 0.04	-0.08	 0.02	-0.06	 0.00	-0.01	 1.00		 	 	 	 	dBio	 9068	 0.347	 (0.476)	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01	 0.00	 0.00	-0.22	 0.05	 0.06	-0.13	-0.04	-0.16	-0.09	-0.02	-0.14	 1.00		 	 	 	Aget	 9068	 12.346	 (4.458)	 0.02	 0.02	-0.01	 0.29	 0.33	 0.13	 0.13	 0.09	-0.35	 0.19	-0.07	-0.05	 0.11	-0.01	 0.24	 0.12	 0.11	-0.08	-0.12	1.00		 	 	(Aget)
2	 9068	172.289	 (109.021)	 0.01	 0.01	-0.02	 0.27	 0.31	 0.12	 0.12	 0.09	-0.39	 0.17	-0.07	-0.05	 0.10	-0.01	 0.24	 0.13	 0.12	-0.07	-0.11	0.98	1.00		 	CodeChair	 9068	 0.590	 (0.855)	 0.01	 0.00	 0.02	 0.18	 0.22	 0.15	 0.15	 0.00	 0.03	 0.08	-0.02	-0.02	 0.06	 0.00	 0.08	 0.03	 0.01	-0.03	-0.10	0.09	0.09	1.00		ln(ContractsUt-1)	 9051	 9.984	 (1.779)	 0.00	 0.00	-0.01	 0.45	 0.41	 0.20	 0.19	 0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	 0.00	-0.02	 0.01	 0.07	 0.05	 0.05	-0.01	 0.00	0.14	0.13	0.10	 1.00	
Notes:	Betweenness	and	Cliquishness	are	both	multiplied	by	104	to	improve	the	uniformity	of	the	order	of	the	variables.	
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7. Appendix	B		
Table	3:	First	stage	and	inflate	(zinb)	regressions	on	the	natural	log	of	the	average	amount	of	contracts	
	 	
First	Stage	-	NbClaims	
	
First	stage	-	NbCitations	
	
inflate	-	NbPatents	
	
inflate	-	NbCitations	 		
	 	
reg	
	
xtreg	
	 	
reg	
	
xtreg	
	 	
logit		
	 	
probit	
	
probit	
	Variable	 I.V.	 (5)	 		 (7)	 		
	
(9)	 		 (11)	 		
	
(3)	 		
	
(12)	 		 (13)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
endo	
	ln(ContractsUt-1)	 x	 0.0914	b	 0.0595	c	
	
0.0914	b	 0.0595	c	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
(0.0356)			 (0.0311)	 		
	
(0.0356)	 		 (0.0311)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 		PastLoopt-1	 x	 0.4777	a	 0.2169	a	
	
0.4777	a	 0.2169	a	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
(0.1369)			 (0.0838)	 		
	
(0.1369)	 		 (0.0838)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 		ln(PastContractst-1)	 x	 4.58E-07			 2.18E-07	a	
	
4.58E-07			 2.18E-07	a	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
2.81E-07			 3.08E-08	 		
	
2.81E-07			 3.08E-08			
	 	 	 	 	 	 		CodeChair	 x	 0.2306	c	 0.3760	a	
	
0.2306	c	 0.3760	a	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
(0.1386)			 (0.1139)	 		
	
(0.1386)	 		 (0.1139)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 		Aget	 x	 0.1703	b	 0.2398	a	
	
0.1703	b	 0.2398	a	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
(0.0769)			 (0.0489)	 		
	
(0.0769)	 		 (0.0489)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 		(Aget)²	 x	 -0.0068	b	 -0.0070	a	
	
-0.0068	b	 -0.0070	a	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
(0.0035)			 (0.0019)	 		
	
(0.0035)	 		 (0.0019)	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 		ln(Grantst-1)	 	 -0.5368	a	 -0.2557	a	 -0.5368	a	 -0.2557	a	 -0.1723 	 -0.0534 	 -0.0569 	
	
	 (0.0775)			 (0.0494)	 		 	 (0.0775)	 		 (0.0494)	 		 	 (0.1103)	 		 	 (0.0718)	 		 (0.0720)			
[ln(Grantst-1)]²	 	 0.0674	a	 0.0361	a	 	 0.0674	a	 0.0361	a	 	 		 		 	 0.0013			 0.0017			
	
	 (0.0067)			 (0.0040)	 		 	 (0.0067)	 		 (0.0040)	 		 	 		 		 	 (0.0056)	 		 (0.0056)			
propComponent	 	 0.0032			 0.0033	 		 	 0.0032			 0.0033			 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
	 	 (0.0041)			 (0.0026)	 		 	 (0.0041)	 		 (0.0026)	 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
nbComponent80	 	 0.0067			 -0.0319	a	 	 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
	 	 (0.0042)			 (0.0062)	 		 	 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
Betweennesst-2	 	 0.1539			 0.1385	b		 0.1539			 0.1385	b	 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
	
	 (0.1159)			 (0.0651)	 		 	 (0.1159)	 		 (0.0651)	 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
ln(Cliquishnesst-2)	 	 -0.0115			 -0.0360	 		 	 -0.0115			 -0.0360			 	 1.4061	 		 	 -0.4233	b	 -0.4275	b	
	
	 (0.1657)			 (0.0935)	 		 	 (0.1657)	 		 (0.0935)	 		 	 (2.4543)	 		 	 (0.1699)	 		 (0.1679)			
[ln(Cliquishnesst-2)]²	 	 0.0007			 0.0014	 		 	 0.0007			 0.0014			 	 -0.0563	 		 	 0.0158	b	 0.0160	b	
	
	 (0.0066)			 (0.0037)	 		 	 (0.0066)	 		 (0.0037)	 		 	 (0.0964)	 		 	 (0.0066)	 		 (0.0065)			
BasicResearcht-1	 	 -0.1231	a	 0.0044	 		 	 -0.1231	a	 0.0044			 	 -1.0587	c	 	 -0.1177	b	 -0.1166	b	
	
	 (0.0347)			 (0.0234)	 		 	 (0.0347)	 		 (0.0234)	 		 	 (0.5511)	 		 	 (0.0548)	 		 (0.0547)			
NbLoopst-1	 	 0.2846			 0.2123	 		 	 0.2846			 0.2123			 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
	
	 (0.2902)			 (0.1365)	 		 	 (0.2902)	 		 (0.1365)	 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 				
PastPatentingt-1	 	 0.0704			 0.1214	 		 	 0.0704			 0.1214			 	 		 		 	 -1.1885	a	 -1.1873	a	
	
	 (0.1693)			 (0.1032)	 		 	 (0.1693)	 		 (0.1032)	 		 	 		 		 	 (0.1421)	 		 (0.1420)			
dNano	 	 -0.4107			 0.0747	 		 	 -0.4107			 0.0747			 	 		 		 	 -0.5173			 -0.4729			
	
	 (0.5802)			 (0.5073)	 		 	 (0.5802)	 		 (0.5073)	 		 	 		 		 	 (0.3878)	 		 (0.3896)			
dBio	 	 0.3476			 0.1951	 		 	 0.3476			 0.1951			 	 		 		 	 0.0827			 0.0865			
	
	 (0.2280)			 (0.1951)	 		 	 (0.2280)	 		 (0.1951)	 		 	 		 		 	 (0.1840)	 		 (0.1817)			
Univ	dummies	 	 yes		 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 yes		
Year	dummies	 	 yes		 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 	 yes	 	 yes		
Constant	
	
-3.0483	a	 0.0000	 		 	 -2.4927	a	 -2.6503	a	 	 -2.2574	 		 	 3.1887	a	 3.1937	a	
	 	
(0.7321)			 (0.0000)	 		 	 (0.6942)	 		 (0.5155)	 		 	 (7.4843)	 		 	 (0.5276)	 		 (0.5201)			
N	
	
8769			 8769	 		
	
8769			 8769			
	
8786	
	 	
8786	
	
8772	
	N	groups	
	
1460			 1460	 		
	
1460			 1460			
	
1460	
	 	
1460	
	
1460	
	Avg	years	
	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	 	
6	
	 	
6	
	
6	
	Log	Likelihood	
	
-25588.1	 	 		 	
	
-25588.1	 	 		 	
	
-2186.6	 	
	
-1457.1	 	 -1456.9	 	
χ2	
	
		 		 2258.9	a	
	
		 		 933.2	a	
	
404.4	a	
	
221.2	a	 228.2	a	
R2	 	 0.1879			 		 		 	 0.1879			 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 		 		
Notes:	 Similar	notes	as	for	Table	1.	
